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CHAPTER i. INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Beef cattle production in the United States consists of three
stages: cow-calf production, an intermediate forage based feeding phase
and confined feedlot finishing. The cow-calf stage produces weaned
calves which are either kept for cow herd replacements (heifer calves) or
sold. The intermediate stage is a period in which the weaned calves
consume a ration which is high in roughage and contains little or no
concentrate feed. This roughage requirement is usually met by having the
weaned calves graze on high quality forage for about six months. The
final stage of beef cattle production entails feeding beef animals a
ration vrtiich contains a high proportion of concentrate feeds, such as
corn, until they reach slaughter weight.
Recently, the intermediate stage has often become a specialized
enterprise operated separately from the cow-calf and feedlot finishing
enterprises. It has become known as a backgrounding or stocker
production enterprise. Both terms will be used in this study.
The stocker operation faces both production and price risk.
Production risk can arise from variability in weight gains or death of
the animal. The variability in gains can be the result of forage quality
variability caused by different moisture and temperature conditions.
This type of production risk is much greater for stocker operations than
for a feedlot operation where gains are fairly predictable.
The other major type of risk faced by the stocker operation is price
risk. A southern Iowa stocker wiLl purchase feeder cattle in the spring
and sell them in the fall after a summer of grazing. This type of
marketing strategy must contend with two major problems involving price
movement. First, there exists a seasonal feeder cattle price pattern
that exhibits highs in the spring and lows in the fall. The second
problem is the extreme variability in prices from year to year. With
this variability in prices comes variable profits.
Figure 1.1 shows an eleven year average of weekly October feeder
cattle futures prices. The tendency was for prices to be higher in the
spring and lower in the fall. Only two years during this period did not
exhibit this seasonal price trend. In some years even the most efficient
stocker operations would have sustained large losses because of the poor
buy/sell margins for that year. For example, in 1974 the cash price for
a 450 pound steer in the Sioux City market in the third week of April was
$49.3/cwt. By September a 650 pound steer in the same market only
brought $32.5/cwt.
The wide price variability in feeder cattle is illustrated in Figure
1.2. The eight year period from 1978 to 1985 contained dramatic changes
in price. Feeder cattle prices ranged from $45/cwt to $89/cwt over this
period.
Stocker operations need to explore alternative marketing methods to
reduce the risks associated with poor buy/sell margins and price
variability so that backgrounding returns are higher and less variable.
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Marketing alternatives could include: examining the possibility of
purchasing and selling cattle at earlier or later dates depending on
local supply and demand conditions; purchasing different types of cattle
including using heifers instead of steers; being prepared to purchase or
sell cattle in markets where prices are out of line with local prices;
exploring the possibility of grazing on a contract basis; and taking
advantage of hedging strategies. This study will focus on using hedging
to reduce variability and increase profits for the stocker operation.
Since 1971 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange has offered a feeder
cattle contract that both producers and consumers of feeder cattle can
use to seek protection from price changes. The stocker operation can use
the feeder cattle futures to hedge both the purchase of lightweight
feeders in the spring and their sale in the fall.
Although futures markets for agricultural products have been
available as a marketing tool for some time now, there is evidence that
these markets have not been utilized by many producers (Schroeder, 1986).
Typically mentioned reasons for lack of use of the feeder cattle futures
market by stocker operations include: contract size that is incompatible
with the volume of small producers, not understanding the mechanics of
hedging, potential basis risk, risk attitudes of producers, and contract
delivery problems.
This study will examine whether a southern Iowa stocker operation
can use alternative hedging strategies with feeder cattle futures to
improve profits and/or reduce risk.
This study will also explore the effects of the recent change in the
feeder cattle futures from delivery of cattle to cash settlement as a
means to fulfill futures contract obligations upon contract maturity.
Review of Literature
There have been numerous studies on the effectiveness of various
hedging strategies for agricultural commodities. Explorations of hedging
strategies that use the feeder cattle futures contract have been common
since its inception in 1971. Many studies have examined the feedlot
operators' use of the contract to hedge the purchase price of feeder
cattle. Some studies have explored the contracts' use by cow-calf
operations in hedging their selling price of weaned calves. Very few
studies exist that delve into the use of the contract by stocker
operators to hedge both the selling price and the purchase price of
feeder cattle.
Franzmann and Lehenbauer (1979) used moving averages to time long
feeder cattle hedges for cattle feeders from 1972 through 1979. They
found that selectively hedging feeder cattle purchases reduced the
variability of purchase prices and reduced the average price paid for
feeders.
Many recent studies have used feeder cattle futures for feedlot
hedging of purchase price in conjunction with hedges placed for live
cattle and corn. These three way hedges are concerned with locking in
returns for cattle feeders.
Leuthold and Mokler (1980) investigated a three way hedge for cattle
feeders during the 1972-76 period. They examined the potential
attainment of various profit levels. A target profit margin of $5/cwt
proved to be superior to all other target levels.
Spahr and Sawaya (1981) also examined three way hedges for cattle
feeders. Using the period from 1974 to 1978 they found a maximum mean
return per head of $27.50. As profit levels increased so did the
variance of returns.
Franzmann and Shields (1981) used moving average techniques to
signal when to hedge using the three way hedge strategy for cattle
feeders. Using weekly data from 1975 through 1979 they found that three
way hedging strategies had higher means than both the cash only strategy
and any other strategies.
Pluhar, Shafer, and Sporleder (1985) evaluated many of the three way
hedges previously contained in the literature as well as some of their
own strategies. They found that none of the strategies performed as well
over a more recent time span than they had during the period analyzed by
their original investigators. They concluded that hedging strategies
need to be continuously revised to keep abreast of new market
characterist ics.
Schroeder (1986) examined the use of price forecasts to signal the
placing of three way hedges. He found that forecast-signaled feeder
cattle hedges were able to increase profitability though not decrease
variability of returns. Forecast-signaled hedges for feeder cattle, corn
8and fed cattle combined were able to both increase returns and decrease
variability of returns.
Dole and St. Clair (1981) examined the use of short hedges on feeder
cattle for both cow-calf and stocker operations. Strategies used for the
cow-calf operation included placing hedges based on; breakeven returns,
basis levels, and moving averages. In general, the hedging strategies
increased returns. In about half of the cases, they also decreased the
variability of returns compared to cash marketing.
Dole and St. Clair also examined two hedging strategies for a
stocker operation. The first was a short hedge placed at the time the
cattle were purchased in May and lifted when the cattle were sold in
October. Over the period studied (1972-77), this strategy increased
gross returns per head by 25% and reduced the standard deviation by 63%
compared to cash marketing. The second strategy was the same as the
first but with an added long April hedge placed in the first week of
January. This strategy increased returns 45% and increased the standard
deviation 13% over cash marketing.
Bobst, Grunewald and Davis (1982) studied the placing of short
hedges at the time of cash purchases of feeder cattle for stocker
operations in Kentucky for the 1973-80 period. The results for two
different starting weights and five different feeding length periods were
compared to cash marketing. They found that both means and standard
deviations of rates of returns for unhedged enterprises were larger than
for their hedged counterparts.
Jenkins, Carver and Menkhaus (1986) examined the optimum time period
in which to place a short feeder cattle hedge for a cow-calf or stocker
operation for the 1974-85 period. They found that late February or early
March represented the best time to place a short fall hedge. The early
May to late June period proved to be a poor time to place a short hedge.
Schupp and Whitehead (1986) evaluated the potential use of
technically oriented selective hedging strategies with feeder cattle
futures as a means of reducing price variability for cow-calf or stocker
operations. They found that average returns could be increased over
unhedged returns with the use of technical systems that produce buy and
sell signals. They compared the variance of returns from the various
hedging strategies, but no comparison with the variance of unhedged
returns was made.
Object ives
The objectives of this study are:
1. To determine the profitability of stocker operations in Southern Iowa
from 1974 to 1985 on a cash marketing basis alone. The results of
this analysis will be used as a guideline by which all hedging
strategy results will be compared.
2. To develop and test the historical profitability of several selective
hedging strategies for stocker operations using the feeder cattle
futures contract.
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3. To compare and rank the marketing strategies tested according to the
distribution of profits and losses from a simulated marketing
process.
4. To examine how the performance of hedging strategies may change with
the advent of cash settlement instead of delivery as the means by
which futures contract obligations are fulfilled upon maturity.
Procedures
Ten hedging strategies will be developed that incorporate most of
the common techniques that can be used in hedging with the feeder cattle
futures contract.
An analysis will be done of the recent historical (1974 through
1985) opportunities for stocker operators to have increased returns and
decreased variance of returns by using the feeder cattle contract. The
ten hedging strategies will be evaluated and compared to a cash marketing
strategy using relevant data for a southern Iowa stocker operation. The
strategies will contain short positions, long positions, and short and
long positions placed simultaneously or placed independently.
Marketing alternatives will be compared to determine the superior
marketing strategy for the 1974 through 1985 simulation period. These
results should provide stockers with a useful evaluation of marketing
strategies that could be used in their operations.
The new cash settlement addition to the feeder cattle contract will
be examined to determine if it will be successful in reducing basis risk
and thereby make hedging a more attractive marketing alternative.
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By examiaing multiple hedging strategies Involving the use of the
feeder cattle futures to hedge both the purchase and sale of feeder
cattle for a stocker operation, this study will be examining an area
neglected in the present literature. With the analysis being directly
applied to southern Iowa stocker operations, the findings of this study
should have practical applications for these producers.
Organizat ion
This study is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 examines various hedging strategies and the motivation
behind their creation and use. The potential advantages and
disadvantages of each strategy in various price behavior climates is
discussed.
Chapter 3 provides a summary of the strategies used in the
historical hedging strategy simulations, and the assumptions made v^en
implementing and assessing the strategies. This chapter also contains
the results of the simulation and the ranking of the alternative
marketing strategies.
Chapter 4 examines the effects of the new cash settlement aspect of
hedging with feeder cattle futures, and how it changes appropriate
hedging procedures. Cash settlement's effect on basis risk will be used
as a criterion for judging its effectiveness.
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the marketing strategies evaluated,
and mentions factors that need to be considered in the future use of
these strategies.
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CHAPTER 2. HEDGING STRATEGIES
There are several categories of hedging strategies that a stocker
operation could use to hedge its cash position. These categories range
from placing a hedge at a certain time of the year to placing a hedge
based on complex price forecasts. Certain strategies only involve the
placement of a single short position or a single long position to hedge
either the selling or the buying price. Other strategies include the
simultaneous placement of short and long positions to lock in an expected
margin. Hedging strategies may require that a position be held until the
cattle are either bought or sold, vrtiile others contain rules for lifting
and replacing positions. Each type of strategy has its advantages. A
producer needs to compare the potential returns from different strategies
to the risk involved in using them and the costs required to implement
them when deciding which hedging approach, if any, should be used.
Hedges
Routine hedge
A routine hedge is defined as placing a short hedge at the time the
feeding period begins. This hedge can be placed simply, though it may
not cover total costs, variable costs or cash flow requirements.
Seasonal hedge
A seasonal hedge is one that is placed at a particular time of the
year. For example, if feeder cattle prices have a tendency to rise from
13
January to April each year, the producer may decide to hedge April cash
purchases with a long April futures position taken in the first week of
January every year. The decision to hedge was made in advance and did
not depend on actual price levels that prevailed in January.
Profit level hedge
A profit level hedge is placed when the appropriate futures price
is at a level that is equal to or greater than a predetermined price.
TTiis target price is equal to the cost of production plus a specified
profit, Stocker operations have the ability to use this approach with
the fall contract or with a combination of the spring and fall
contracts.
Short hedge The short profit level hedge is placed anytime after
the start of the feeding period when the fall futures price can provide a
return greater than or equal to a selected profit goal. If over the
course of backgrounding the fall futures price does not yield returns at
or above the profit goal, then no hedge is placed.
To determine if the futures market offers a breakeven return or not,
the futures price needs to be converted into a local cash price. This is
accomplished by adjusting the futures price according to the local basis.
If the expected local basis (cash - futures) for September is S2.00/cwt
then the futures price is converted into a local cash price by adding
$2.00/cwt to its amount.
It is difficult for the hedge to yield the exact amount expected
because of basis fluctuation. For example, after purchasing feeder
14
cattle in the spring the stocker knows most of his costs and can fairly
easily estimate those costs not yet Incurred. Based on this cost figure
the stocker can calculate the selling price needed to breakeven. When
checking the futures market to see if the fall contract is at or above
this price, the stocker needs to convert the futures price into a local
cash price. If the final basis differs from the one expected then the
hedge will not yield the exact return expected. Sometimes the change in
basis can be beneficial and other times not.
With the profit level hedge there is always the possibility that no
hedge will be placed because the futures did not reach the target price
anytime during the backgrounding phase. This is a definite disadvantage
because there are times when locking in a small profit or a small loss is
a superior alternative to sustaining larger losses in an unhedged
market.
Long-short hedge A potential hedge that exists for stocker
operations is to hedge both the purchase and sale of feeder cattle using
different contract months. The long-short profit level hedge is placed
when the spread between the spring and fall futures contracts reaches an
amount that yields the target profit. The target profit is equal to a
breakeven price plus a predetermined profit. The breakeven price is
defined as:
B.E. = (expected weight at sale * adjusted fall futures)
- (expected weight at purchase * adjusted spring futures)
- all nonfeeder costs
15
If the target profit is reached, the stocker buys the spring
contract and sells the fall contract. When the cattle are purchased the
spring contract is sold, thus offsetting the long position. When the
cattle are sold the fall contract is purchased, thus offsetting the short
position.
In order to ascertain if the futures spread offers a return greater
than the target price, both contracts need to be converted into local
cash prices by adjusting for expected local basis. As in the short
profit level hedge, actual basis amounts that differ from the ones used
to calculate the target price can make the final returns differ from the
expected.
This hedging strategy has the particular advantage of enabling the
stocker to determine and lock in profits months before the actual
purchase of feeder cattle is made. Another advantage is the potentially
long period of time for a good hedging opportunity to present itself. In
many years, the September contract starts trading in October of the
previous year. This provides the stocker operation with almost six
months to lock in a long-short profit level hedge.
Such a hedge might help a stocker secure the loan necessary to cover
the purchase price of feeder cattle in the spring. Lending institutions
are more inclined to loan money to enterprises that insulate themselves
from price risk.
16
Basis hedge
With a basis hedge, the decision of when or whether to hedge relies
upon the distant month's basis. If the feeders are going to be sold in
September then the difference between today's cash price and the
September futures is used as a guideline for hedging.
Distant month basis is actually a price expectation. If the basis
for September ia April is below the delivery month basis for September
then the futures market is expecting cash prices will fall. This alone
is not a reason to hedge. If cash prices do indeed fall to the level
predicted by the futures market then a hedge would not have insulated the
stocker from the decline in prices because the futures market had already
successfully incorporated the price change. Hedging could only provide
protection if prices had fallen by more than the amount predicted in
April. On the other hand, if prices fall, but not by the amount
predicted by the futures market, then the September contract will have to
rise in price and hedging under this scenario would have produced a loss
for the futures contract even though cash prices had fallen.
Dole and St. Clair (1981) advanced two theories involving the use of
basis to hedge. One theory states that a negative basis (futures greater
than cash) indicates that futures market participants believe prices will
rise. The second theory states that a negative basis is an indication
that futures will have to fall relative to cash to reach normal delivery
month basis. The theories assume a local basis of $0.00. A stocker
would need to know his local basis in order to determine if the distant
month's basis was more negative than the delivery month basis.
17
Boch theories assume the futures market prediction about fall prices
is incorrect. The first theory assumes that prices will rise by more
than the ^ount predicted by the futures market and the second theory
assumes the price will rise by less than the futures prediction.
Hedging under the first theory involves placing a short fall hedge
anytime after the start of the feeding period when the fall delivery
month basis becomes more negative than usual. This level is determined
by a historical review of the basis.
Hedging under the second theory involves placing a short fall hedge
anytime after the start of the feeding period when the fall delivery
month basis becomes more positive than usual. Again, this level is
determined by a historical review of the basis.
Technical hedges
Technical analysis can be used to forecast price direction and
hedges can be placed accordingly. Technical analysis is the art of using
past prices to explain or predict future changes in prices.
Practitioners of technical analysis believe that by observing past
prices, patterns in their behavior can be discerned. There are numerous
technical indicators that can be used to forecast price changes and
thereby place hedges. Two of the more common indicators will be
d Lscussed.
Moving average hedge One simple tool used by technicians is the
moving average. A moving average is a progressive average of prices. As
18
time progresses, new prices are added Co the calculation, and an equal
number of the oldest prices are deleted.
Technicians have observed that by using different length moving
averages it may be possible to identify trends in prices, A ten day
moving average will be much more sensitive to a change in current prices
than a thirty day moving average because a higher percent of its prices
are the most current available. Whenever the shorter length average
"crosses" (on a plot) a longer length average then the technicians
believe a trend in prices may have been established. A crucial aspect of
using moving averages is to find the correct length of the two averages.
In general, the smaller the difference in lengths the less sensitive is
the system in signalling a new price trend. This keeps the system from
sending false price signals, but it also slows down the process of
identifying a real trend.
Price trend signals generated from moving averages can be used as
hedging signals. An increasing price trend signal generated in October
through April could be used as an indicator to buy the April contract and
insulate feeder purchases from increasing prices. A decreasing price
trend signal generated in May through September could be used as an
indicator to sell the September contract and insulate feeder sales from
decreasing prices. A hedge could be placed and lifted one or more times
depending on the number of signals generated.
Oscillator hedge Oscillators use price changes to signal trends.
A momentum oscillator analyzes the rate of change of prices from one time
19
period to the next. As momentum decreases, technicians believe a change
in the direction of prices is imminent.
When the momentum values change from positive to negative during the
feeding period a short fail hedge is placed. When the momentum values
change from negative to positive before the cattle are purchased a long
position in the spring contract is placed.
Oscillators are very good at predicting price changes (Schupp and
Whitehead, 1986). This feature can be both an advantage and a hindrance.
If price changes are few and strong then the early indication of change
provided by an oscillator is useful. If price changes are occurring
rapidly then oscillators can generate two to three times more trades than
moving averages and reduce the profit potential of each trade. Similar
to using moving averages, a hedge could be placed and lifted multiple
times until the cattle are bought or sold.
ARIMA hedge
An ARIMA hedge is one that uses time series analysis to generate
price forecasts. Time series refers to the analysis of observations on a
variable that occurs in a time sequence. Similar to technical analysis,
time series uses past price behavior to predict future prices. Unlike
technical analysis, however, time series quantifies the relationship.
Correlation is used to measure the relationships between observations
within a price series.
ARIMA models may contain both autoregressive (AR) and integrated
moving average (IMA) terms. Autoregressive terms describe how an
20
observation (price) is related to the immediately past value of the same
variable. Integrated moving average terms describe how an observation is
related to the unexplained part of previous price behavior.
Forecasts of future prices can be made based on the ARIMA terms
discovered from past price behavior. If forecasts for spring prices are
higher than April futures then a long hedge should be placed. If
forecasts for fall prices are lower than September futures then a short
hedge should be placed. For more details on the use of time series
analysis see Pankratz (1983).
Econometric hedge
Econometrics is the art and science of using statistical methods for
measuring economic relationships. Economic theory helps identify the
variables which should appear in a relationship. Statistical methods
determine the sign and magnitudes of variable coefficients that describe
the relationship.
In the case of feeder cattle prices, economic theory suggests there
is a relationship between the price of feeder cattle and its supply and
demand. Using the statistical method of linear regression provides a
measurement indicating the direction and magnitude of the effect these
supply and demand variables have upon feeder cattle prices.
If reliable data can be found that accurately indicate the supply
and demand for feeder cattle, then an econometric model can be developed
that produces estimates of feeder prices that are very close to the
actual values. When using such a model to forecast prices, forecasted
21
values of the supply and demand variables must be used. Therefore, even
if an econometric model can correctly estimate current prices using
current supply and demand variables there is no guarantee it will
forecast future prices with the same accuracy.
For hedging purposes, a long hedge is placed in the October to April
time period if the model predicts higher prices than an appropriate
futures value. A short hedge is placed in the May to September period if
the model predicts a lower price than an appropriate futures value.
Stop order
Any hedge can be supplemented with a stop order that can be used by
hedgers to exit positions. A fixed stop is placed when a position is
taken. It is an instruction to the broker to offset the hedge if prices
fall or rise to a specified amount. Short hedgers hope to exit short
positions when prices are rising and long hedgers hope to exit long
positions when prices are falling.
The stop order should be used with caution. The execution of the
order once again places the stocker at the mercy of price changes. Stop
orders work well in years with strong price trends. In these years
either prices trend down and the stop order never comes into play, or
prices trend up and the order is executed and the loss of price
protection has no adverse effects. In years with alternating price
movements a stop order could lift the hedge in a climate where price risk
protection is needed. The correct price level to place the order at is
22
extremely important in these nontrend years. It would be tempting to
look at historical data and "discover" a stop-loss order level that would
have correctly lifted the hedge in all years where the final price was
above purchase price and that would not lift the hedge when the final
price was below purchase price. There is little evidence to suggest that
this "ideal" stop order would perform as well in subsequent years.
23
CHAPTER 3. SIMULATION PROCEDURES AND RESULTS
To evaluate the potential returns from hedging, alternative hedging
strategies were developed and applied to data from 1974 through 1985.
The results were compared to cash marketing returns for a southern Iowa
stocker operation. The strategies, though, are applicable to
backgrounding operations in any geographical region.
Simulation Assumptions
The simulation involved backgrounding cattle for 5 months each year
during the period from 1974 through 1985. Cattle were assumed to be
placed on pasture in the third week of April and marketed in the third
week of September.
The production assumptions that were used in the simulation are
shown in Table 3.1. The feeder cattle were purchased at an average
weight of 600 pounds. The average daily gain was 1.13 lbs and the cattle
gained approximately 170 lbs. The average daily gain figure incorporates
shrink. The pasture was assumed to be improved bluegrass with an annual
application of 60 pounds per acre of nitrogen fertilizer. Death loss was
assumed to be one percent of all animals on pasture. The assiamptions are
based on Iowa State University estimates (Strohbehn, 1985).
Assumed production costs for the simulation are shown in Table 3.2.
All costs are listed on a per head basis. Pasture rent figures were
obtained from the Iowa Crop and Livestock Reporting Service. The per
head pasture costs are based on the cost per acre for renting improved
24
Table 3.1. Production assumptions for simulation
Placement weight 600 lbs.
Effective marketing weight (minus shrink) 770 lbs.
Time on pasture 5 months
Total gain 170 lbs.
Average daily gain 1.13 lbs.
Death loss 1 percent
Acres/steers .67
Pasture type Improved bluegrass
Fertilizer 60 pounds nitrogen
grass in southern Iowa for the summer grazing period. Per head interest
charges are based on interest rates reported in the the USDA Meat and
Poultry Situation and Outlook Report for a corn belt feedlot operation in
the April to September period. The interest charges cover the five month
feeding period. All other costs were based on 1985 estimates from Iowa
State University (Strohbehn, 1985). Their pre-1985 values were obtained
by deflating the 1985 values by price changes which occurred in cost
series for closely related products. All costs series other than salt
and fertilizer were found in the corn belt feedlot operation costs
reported by U.S.D.A. Salt and fertilizer costs were found in
Agricultural Prices, a U.S.D.A. publication.
Price data for cash and futures markets were used in the simulation.
Futures market prices used were daily closing prices for feeder cattle
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Cash prices were for 600 and
800 pound medium frame number one feeder steers prices for Iowa livestock
markets. These prices were obtained from the Livestock Market Summary, a
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publication of the Iowa Department of Agriculture, which reports weekly
data on Iowa feeder cattle prices.
Futures transaction brokerage conrailssions were assumed to be $60 per
contract (round turn) for feeder cattle. Margins for hedging were
assumed at $1200 per contract. Interest charges on margins were
calculated with the interest rates used in Table 3.2 from the time of
margin deposit until the liquidation of the hedge.
Assumptions also had to be made about predicted basis. When
hedging, all futures prices need to be converted into local cash prices
so that potential profits can be determined. In order to localize a
futures price one needs to form an expectation about what the basis will
be at the time the hedge is lifted. Typically, this expectation would
probably be based on an average of the basis occurring over the last few
years. Since there was little change in the basis over the last 12
years, an average for the entire period was used rather than recalculate
an estimated basis each year from prior data.
Profit Opportunities
The entire process of developing and testing hedging strategies is a
moot one if no profit opportunities exist through the use of the futures
market. Figure 3.1 shows the estimated returns to a southern Iowa
stocker operation from 1974 to 1985 using cash marketing. Profits
averaged $2.06/hd during this period. Whether or not profit
opportunities were present using the feeder cattle futures market was
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tested using both long and short hedges during the time both contracts
for the same year were trading simultaneously.
Buying an April contract and selling a September contract on the
same day and offsetting both contracts on their expiration dates produces
price protection for both the purchase and sale of feeder cattle.
Adjusting each futures price for local basis and subtracting nonfeeder
costs produces a net profit return for each day both the April and
September contracts of the same year are being traded.
Table 3.3 shows different profit Levels and the percent of trading
days that they were available during the simulation period. Overall,
only 14 percent of the days when both the April and September contracts
for the same year were being traded was the profit not above zero.
Almost 43 percent of the returns were between zero and ten dollars per
head and 43 percent were between 20 and 60 dollars per head profit. Of
the individual years, only 1975 was unable to provide a breakeven return.
Seven of the years did not contain any trading days that returned a below
breakeven profit level.
Market ing Strategies
Nine hedging strategies were simulated using 1974-1985 data and ten
using the 1981-1985 data to determine if returns could be increased
and/or variance decreased over the cash marketing position. Each hedging
strategy and its implementation are discussed below.
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Table 3.3. Distribution of daily profit opportunit ies from an
April--Se ptember spread, 1974-•1985
Profit levels ($/hd)
60+ 40-60 20-40 0-20 -20-0
1974 10.5 84.2 5.3
1975 100.0
1976 1.9 96.2 1.9
1977 25.5 74.5
1978 13.9 85.4 .7
1979 3.4 75.9 20.7
1980 61.5 37.8 .7
1981 6.9 92.4 .8
1982 2.9 42.4 54.7
1983 1.0 69.0 30.0
1984 .9 99.1
1985 44.9 42.3 12.8
1974-85® .4% 19.3% 23.7% 42.7% 13.8%
This IS not a simple average of each ^year, it is an average of all
trading days during these years when both contracts for the same year
were trading simultaneously.
Strategy 1: routine hedge
A short position in the September futures contract was taken in the
third week of April at the time the feeder cattle were purchased. This
contract was offset in the third week of September by buying the
September contract. The hedge was held until the sale of the cattle in
September regardless of price movements during the feeding period.
Strategy II; routine hedge with a stop order
The same strategy as I but with a stop-loss order placed $2.00/cwt
above the September futures hedge entry price. Once the order was
executed there was no reentry into the futures market.
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Strategy III; short: breakeven hedge
A short position Ln the September contract was taken any time daring
or after the third week of April when the futures price covered all
costs. If a hedge was placed anytime during the feeding period, it was
offset during the third week of September. In order to determine If
futures offered a breakeven return or not the September futures price was
converted into a local cash price by adding the expected delivery month
basis for September. The expected basis was arrived at by computing the
average September basis for a southern Iowa stocker over the 1974 to 1985
period.
Strategy IV: short breakeven hedge with a stop order
•me same as strategy III but with a stop-loss order placed $2.00/cwt
above the September futures hedge entry price. Once the order was
executed there was no reentry into the futures market.
Strategy V: long-short breakeven hedge
A short position in the September contract and a long position in
the April contract were simultaneously taken when the spread between the
two contracts provided a hedge that covered all costs. The April
contract was offset in the third week of April when the cattle were
purchased and the September contract was offset when the cattle were sold
in the third week of September.
Both the April and September contracts were adjusted for local
delivery month basis so that they would reflect local cash prices. The
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April and September delivery month basis were determined by computing
their averages for southern Iowa during the 1974-1985 period.
Strategy VI: long-short $15/hd profit hedge
The same as strategy V except the simultaneous placement of the long
April and short September positions was not made unless the basis
adjusted futures' prices offered a $15/hd profit. The $i5/hd profit was
not chosen as an optimal level. It was, however, a profit amount that
was available every year except 1975 when no profits were available using
a long-short hedge.
Strategy VII: negative basis hedge
A short position in the September contract was placed anytime during
the feeding period when the September basis became more negative than
$-2.50. The contract was offset in September with the sale of the
cattle. The weekly basis was calculated based on Sioux City 600-700 lb
medium frame #1 steers.
Strategy VIII: positive basis hedge
A short position in the September contract was placed anytime during
the feeding period when the September basis (cash-futures) became greater
than $2.50. The contract was offset in September when the cattle were
sold. The weekly basis was calculated based on Sioux City 600-700 lb
medium frame #1 steers.
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SLraiegy IX: moving average hedge
A short position in the September contract was placed anytime from
May to September when the moving averages signaled a down trend in
prices. The contract was offset when either an up trend in prices was
signaled or when the cattle were sold in September. A long position in
the April contract was placed anytime from October to April when the
moving averages signaled an up trend in prices. The contract was offset
when either a down trend in prices was signaled or when the cattle were
purchased in September. Multiple buy or sell signals could be generated
during a year and cash positions were hedged and unhedged accordingly.
Thirty day and ten day moving averages were used so that trends could be
identified without the whipsaw effect that comes from moving averages
using shorter time spans. These two moving averages were only chosen to
illustrate the use of moving averages in hedging. They are not optimal
length averages. Supposed optimal length moving averages are only
optimal over the historical data they were tested on.
Strategy X; econometric hedge
The quarterly econometric model produced one quarter ahead price
forecasts. The futures price of the nearby contract for the next quarter
was the price being predicted. Forecasts were available in the third
week of January, April, July and October. If the January futures
forecast made in the third week of October was higher than the January
futures on that date then a long April position was taken. If the April
futures forecast made in January was higher than the April futures
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contract, on that day then a long position was taken in the April
contract, unless it was already placed in the previous quarter.
If the July forecast made in April was lower than the August futures
Cthere is no contract for July) on that day then a short September
position was taken. If the October futures forecast made in July was
Lower Lhan the October futures on that day then a short position in the
September contract was taken, unless it was already placed in the
previous quarter.
The econometric hedge was used to produce forecasts for the 1981 to
1985 period. There was insufficient data prior to 1974 to develop
earlier forecasts. Appendix A contains a complete explanation of the
econometric hedge and its limitations.
Performance of Alternative Marketing Strategies
Performance criterion
The marketing strategies were analyzed with a standard mean variance
analysis. Strategies having higher average returns and lower variances
Lhan the cash marketing position are unambiguously superior to cash
marketing. SLrategies with lower means and higher variances are
unambiguously inferior Lo cash marketing. SLraLegies with eiLher a
higher mean and higher variance or a lower mean and lower variance can't
be defined as superior or inferior Lo cash marketing.
Although mean variance analysis has an intuitive appeal as a
performance criterion for hedging strategies, it contains some drawbacks.
34
Under this criterion a strategy is unambiguously superior to another only
if it contains both a higher mean and a lower variance. Comparisons
between two strategies, each with either a superior mean or variance
can't be made. For example, a strategy that produced no profits but had
a very low variance could not be deemed inferior to a strategy with much
higher returns and a slightly higher variance. High variance may not be
a problem when returns are significantly higher too.
A performance criterion that can complement mean variance analysis
is the one standard deviation rule. If returns are distributed normally
then the mean return minus one standard deviation will be an indicator of
the potential problems associated with high variance. Subtracting one
standard deviation from the mean will produce a profit figure that
approximately 82% of all expected profit returns should be larger than.
The larger this amount, the less variability is a concern. This
performance criterion should help distinguish among the strategies that
can't be compared by mean variance analysis. It is important to note
that this criterion implicitly assumes a one to one tradeoff between mean
and variance. This weighting system may not be applicable to many
decision makers. The risk aversion of a stocker operator should be
accounted for in assigning weights to the mean variance tradeoff.
Results of strategies
The results of the alternative marketing strategies for feeder
cattle are shown in Tables 3.4 through 3.14. Each table (except for cash
marketing) contains the dates and corresponding futures prices for each
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Table 3.4. Cash marketing strategy
Year Purchased Sold
Date Price Date Price
Per
animal
gain
Non-
feeder
costs
Net
profit
1974 4/19 47.00 9/20 30.50 -47.15 45.64 -92.79
1975 4/18 32.50 9/19 40.00 113.00 48.13 64.87
1976 4/19 48.50 9/20 38.00 1.60 49.66 -48.06
1977 4/15 41.50 9/20 40.00 59.00 49.04 9.96
1978 4/20 57.00 9/20 64.00 150.80 54.58 96.22
1979 4/20 92.00 9/20 80.00 64.00 70.23 -6.23
1980 4/18 75.00 9/19 76.00 135.20 78.48 56.72
1981 4/16 70.00 9/18 68.00 103,60 85.89 17.71
1982 4/16 69.00 9/20 67.00 101.90 85.92 15.98
1983 4/15 70.00 9/20 58.50 30.45 78.10 -47.65
1984 4/19 68.00 9/20 63.00 77.10 76.05 1.05
1985 4/19 69.50 9/20 58.00 29.60 72.72 -43.12
1974-85 Mean 2.06
Std 51.95
Mean-std -49.90
1981-85 Mean -11.21
Std 28.54
Mean-sCd -39.74
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Table 3.5. Strategy I routine hedge
Year Sale Purchase Per
animal
Cost
of
Net profit
Date Price Date Price gain hedging Without With
from futures hedge hedge
1974 4/19 44. 75 9/20 30.00 113.86 1.89 -92.79 19.18
L975 4/18 32.00 9/19 38.75 -52.11 1.98 64.87 10.78
1976 4/19 46.00 9/20 35.60 80.28 1.85 -48.06 30.37
1977 4/15 44.70 9/20 40.50 32.42 1.85 9.96 40.53
1978 4/20 54.95 9/20 67.90 -99.96 1.85 96.22 -5.59
1979 4/20 90.37 9/20 84.90 42.22 1.85 -6.23 34.15
1980 4/18 71.65 9/19 75.42 -29.10 2.25 56.72 25.37
1981 4/16 72.67 9/18 69 .72 22.77 2.59 17.71 37.89
1982 4/16 64.00 9/20 67.85 -29.72 2.55 15.98 -16.29
1983 4/15 65.65 9/20 59.37 48.48 2.06 -47.65 -1.23
1984 4/19 65.50 9/20 64.95 4.25 2.26 1.05 3.03
1985 4/19 68.45 9/20 62.70 44.39 2.26 -43.12 -0.99
1974-85 Mean 2.06 14.77
Std 51.95 18.23
Me an-St d -49.90 -3.46
1981-85 Mean -11.21 4.48
Std 28.54 17.96
Mean-std -39.74 -13.47
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Table 3.6. Strategy II routine hedge with a stop order
Year Sale Purchase Per
animal
gain
with futures
Cost
of
hedging
Net 1profit
Date Price Date Price Without
hedge
With
hedge
1974 4/19 4A.75 9/20 30.00 113.86 1.89 -92.79 19.18
1975 4/18 32.00 5/5 34.00 -15.44 1.23 64.87 48.20
1976 4/ 19 46.00 9/20 35.60 80.28 1.85 -48.06 30.37
1977 4/15 44.70 9/20 40.50 32.42 1.85 9.96 40.53
1978 4/20 54.95 4/28 56.95 -15.44 1.05 96.22 79.73
1979 4/20 90.37 9/20 84.90 42.22 1.85 -6.23 34.15
1980 4/18 71.65 5/12 73.65 -15.44 1.28 56.72 40.00
1981 4/16 72.67 9/18 69 .72 22.77 2.58 17.71 37.90
1982 4/16 64.00 4/21 66.00 -15.44 1.05 15.98 -0.51
1983 4/15 65.65 9/20 59.37 48 .48 2,33 -47.65 -1.50
1984 4/19 65.50 7/16 67.50 -15.44 1.77 1.05 -16.16
1985 4/19 68.45 9/20 62.70 44.39 2.26 -43.12 -0.99
1974-85 Mean 2.06 25.91
Std 51.95 25.86
Mean-std -49.90 0.05
1981-85 Me an -11.21 3.75
Std 28.54 18.06
Mean-std -39.74 -14.31
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Table 3.7 Strategy III short breakeven hedge
Year Sale Purchase Per
aaimal
gain
from futures
Cost
of
hedging
Net profit
Date Price Date Price Without
hedge
With
hed ge
1974 4/19 44.75 9/20 30.00 113.86 1.89 -92.79 19.18
1975 5/2 33.75 9/19 38.75 -38.60 1.98 64.87 24.29
1976 4/19 46.00 9/20 35.60 80.28 1.85 -48.06 30.37
1977 4/15 44.70 9/20 40.50 32.42 1.85 9.96 40.5 3
1978 4/20 54.95 9/20 67.90 -99.96 1.85 96.22 -5.59
1979 4/20 90.37 9/20 84.90 42.22 1.85 -6.23 34.15
1980 4/18 71.65 9/19 75.42 -29.10 2.25 56.72 25.37
1981 4/16 72.67 9/18 69.72 22.77 2.58 17.71 37.90
1982 5/6 66.75 9/20 67.85 -8.49 2.55 15.98 4.94
1983 5/5 66.35 9/20 59.37 53.88 2.33 -47.65 3.90
1984 4/23 65.30 9/20 64.95 2.70 2.26 1.05 1.49
1985 4/19 68.45 9/20 62.70 44.39 2.26 -43.12 -0.99
1974-85 Mean 2.06 17.96
Std 51.95 15.74
Mean-std -49.90 2.22
1981-85 Mean -11.21 9.45
Std 28.54 14.37
Mean-std -39.74 -4.92
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Table 3.8, Strategy IV short breakeven hedge with stop
Year Sale
Date Price
Purchase
Date
Per
— animal
Price gain hedging Without
from futures hedge
Cost
of
Net profit
With
hedge
1974 4/19 44.75 9/20 30.00 113.86 1.89 -92.79 19.18
1975 5/2 33.75 6/9 35.75 -15.44 1.23 64.87 48.20
1976 4/19 46.00 9/20 35 .60 80.28 L.85 -48.06 30.37
1977 4/15 44.70 9/20 40.50 32.42 1.85 9.96 40.53
1978 4/20 54.95 5/1 56.95 -15.44 1.05 96.22 79.73
1979 4/20 90.37 9/20 84.90 42.22 1.85 -6.23 34.15
1980 4/18 71.65 5/12 73.65 -15.44 1.28 56.72 40.00
1981 4/16 72.67 9/18 69.72 22.77 2.58 17.71 37.90
1982 5/6 66.75 8/6 68.75 -15.44 1.94 15.98 -1.40
1983 5/5 66.35 9/20 59.37 53.88 2.33 -47.65 3.90
1984 4/23 65.30 7/13 67.30 -15.44 1.77 1.05 -16.16
1985 4/19 68.45 9/20 62.70 44.39 2.26 -43.12 -0.99
1974-85 Mean 2.06 26.28
Std 51.95 25.50
Mean-s td -49.90 0.78
1981-85 Mean -11.21 4.65
Std 28.54 17.93
Mean-std -39.74 -13.28
T
ab
le
3
.9
.
S
tr
a
te
g
y
V
lo
n
g
-s
h
o
rt
b
re
ak
ev
en
he
dg
e
Y
e
a
r
D
a
te
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
A
p
ri
l
P
e
r
a
n
im
a
l
g
a
in
fr
o
m
f
u
tu
r
e
s
C
o
s
t
o
f
h
e
d
g
in
g
N
et
p
ro
fi
t
S
a
le
p
ri
c
e
P
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
D
a
te
P
r
ic
e
P
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
S
a
le
p
ri
c
e
—
—
D
a
te
P
r
ic
e
W
it
h
o
u
t
h
e
d
g
e
W
it
h
h
e
d
g
e
1
9
7
4
3
/5
/7
4
4
1
.3
0
9
/2
0
3
0
.0
0
4
2
.2
0
4
/1
9
4
6
.0
0
1
1
6
.5
6
2
.5
5
-
9
2
.7
9
2
1
.2
2
1
9
7
5
1
/6
/7
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
6
4
.8
7
6
4
.8
7
1
9
7
6
3
8
.5
0
9
/2
0
3
5
.6
0
3
8
.8
0
4
/2
0
4
7
.7
5
9
1
.4
7
3
.1
0
-
4
8
.0
6
4
0
.3
1
1
9
7
7
1
1
/1
2
/7
6
4
2
.0
0
9
/2
0
4
0
.5
0
4
1
.6
5
4
/2
0
4
5
.0
0
3
7
.4
4
3
.4
2
9
.9
6
4
3
.9
8
1
9
7
8
9
/2
6
/7
7
4
2
.5
5
9
/2
0
6
7
.9
0
4
2
.1
0
4
/2
0
5
7
.0
0
-
8
0
.6
7
4
.0
5
9
6
.2
2
1
1
.5
1
1
9
7
9
9
/2
1
/7
8
7
3
.5
0
9
/2
0
8
4
.9
0
7
2
.9
2
4
/2
0
9
3
.8
7
7
3
.7
2
4
.0
5
-
6
.2
3
6
3
.4
4
1
9
8
0
1
0
/4
/7
9
8
3
.5
0
9
/1
9
7
5
.4
2
8
5
.8
2
4
/1
8
7
1
.4
5
-
4
8
.5
5
5
.5
4
5
6
.7
2
2
.6
2
1
9
8
1
1
0
/6
/8
0
8
1
.0
0
9
/1
8
6
9
.7
2
8
1
.5
5
4
/2
0
7
1
.1
5
6
.7
9
6
.8
1
1
7
.7
1
1
7
.7
0
1
9
8
2
1
0
/1
/8
1
6
8
.9
5
9
/2
0
6
7
.8
5
6
7
.9
0
4
/2
0
6
7
.9
5
8
.8
8
6
.6
7
1
5
.9
8
1
8
.
1
8
1
9
8
3
1
1
/2
4
/8
2
6
5
.8
0
9
/2
0
5
9
.3
7
6
5
.4
0
4
/2
0
7
0
.0
7
8
5
.6
8
4
.8
4
-
4
7
.6
5
3
3
.1
9
1
9
8
4
1
1
/3
/8
3
6
4
.1
0
9
/2
0
6
4
.9
5
6
4
.8
0
4
/1
9
6
6
.9
0
9
.6
5
5
.1
5
1
.0
5
5
.5
5
1
9
8
5
1
2
/2
8
/8
4
6
8
.2
2
9
/2
0
6
2
.7
0
7
2
.0
7
4
/1
9
6
5
.2
5
-
1
0
.0
4
4
.1
4
-
4
3
.1
2
-
5
7
.3
0
1
9
7
4
-8
5
M
e
a
n
2
.0
6
2
2
.1
1
S
td
5
1
.9
5
3
1
.0
6
M
e
a
n
-
s
td
-
4
9
.9
0
-
8
.9
5
1
9
8
1
-8
5
M
e
a
m
-
1
1
.2
1
3
.4
6
S
td
2
8
.5
4
3
1
.6
2
M
e
a
n
-
s
td
-
3
9
.7
4
-
2
8
.1
6
o
T
ab
le
3
.1
0
.
S
tr
a
te
g
y
V
I
lo
n
g
-s
h
o
rt
$
1
5
/h
d
p
ro
fi
t
he
dg
e
Y
e
a
r
D
a
te
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
S
a
le
p
ri
c
e
P
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
A
p
ri
l
P
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
P
r
ic
e
-
S
a
le
P
e
r
C
o
s
t
a
n
im
a
l
o
f
g
a
in
h
e
d
g
in
g
fr
o
m
f
u
t
u
r
e
s
N
et
p
ro
fi
t
W
it
h
o
u
t
W
it
h
h
e
d
g
e
h
e
d
g
e
D
a
te
P
r
ic
e
D
a
te
P
r
i
c
e
1
9
7
4
3
/1
8
/7
4
4
5
.5
0
9
/2
0
3
0
.0
0
4
5
.0
0
'
4
/1
9
4
6
.0
0
1
2
7
.3
7
2
.2
1
-
9
2
.7
9
3
2
.3
7
1
9
7
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
6
4
.8
7
6
4
.8
7
1
9
7
6
3
/2
/7
6
4
0
.5
0
9
/2
0
3
5
.6
0
3
9
.0
2
4
/2
0
4
7
.7
5
1
0
5
.2
1
2
.4
7
-
4
8
.0
6
5
4
.6
8
1
9
7
7
1
1
/1
7
/7
6
4
2
.1
2
9
/2
0
4
0
.5
0
4
1
.0
2
4
/2
0
4
5
.0
0
4
3
.2
3
3
.4
2
9
.9
6
4
9
.7
7
1
9
7
8
1
0
/3
/7
7
4
3
.0
0
9
/2
0
6
7
.9
0
4
2
.2
2
4
/2
0
5
7
.0
0
-
7
8
.1
2
4
.0
5
9
6
.2
2
1
4
.0
5
1
9
7
9
9
/2
1
/7
8
7
3
.5
0
9
/2
0
8
4
.9
0
7
2
.9
2
4
/2
0
9
3
.8
7
7
3
.7
2
4
.0
5
-
6
.2
3
6
3
.4
4
1
9
8
0
1
0
/4
/7
9
8
3
.5
0
9
/1
9
7
5
.4
2
8
5
.8
2
4
/1
8
7
1
.4
5
-
4
8
.5
5
5
.5
4
5
6
.7
2
2
.6
2
1
9
8
1
1
0
/6
/8
0
8
1
.0
0
9
/1
8
6
9
.7
2
8
1
.5
5
4
/2
0
7
1
.1
5
6
.7
9
6
.8
1
1
7
.7
1
1
7
.7
0
1
9
8
2
1
0
/1
/8
1
6
8
.9
5
9
/2
0
6
7
.8
5
6
7
.9
0
4
/2
0
6
7
.9
5
8
.8
8
6
.6
7
1
5
.9
8
1
8
.
1
8
1
9
8
3
1
1
/2
4
/8
2
6
5
.8
0
9
/2
0
5
9
.3
7
6
5
.4
0
4
/2
0
7
0
.0
7
8
5
.6
8
4
.8
4
-
4
7
.6
5
3
3
.1
9
1
9
8
4
1
2
/6
/8
3
6
6
.4
5
9
/2
0
6
4
.9
5
6
7
.5
5
4
/1
9
,
6
6
.9
0
6
.5
6
4
.6
6
1
.0
5
2
.9
5
1
9
8
5
1
/9
/8
5
6
8
.5
5
9
/2
0
6
2
.7
0
7
1
.0
5
4
/1
9
6
5
.2
5
0
.3
9
4
.1
4
-
4
3
.1
2
-
4
6
.8
8
1
9
7
4
- -
8
5
M
e
a
n
2
.0
6
2
5
.5
8
S
td
5
1
.9
5
3
0
.3
5
M
e
a
n
-
s
td
-
4
9
.9
0
-
4
.7
7
1
9
8
1
- -
8
5
M
e
a
n
-
1
1
.2
1
5
.0
3
S
td
2
8
.5
4
2
7
.6
6
M
e
a
n
-
s
td
-
3
9
.7
4
-
2
2
.6
3
42
Table 3.11. Strategy VII negative basis hedge
Year Sale Purchase Per Cost Net profit
animal of
Date Price Date Price gain hedging Without With
from futures hedge hedge
1974 0.00 0.00 -92.79 -92.79
1975 0.00 0.00 64.87 64.87
1976 5/21 44.50 9/20 35 .60 68.70 1.68 -48.06 18.96
1977 0.00 0.00 9.96 9.96
1978 0.00 0.00 96.22 96.22
1979 8/17 82.50 9/20 84 .90 -18.53 1.20 -6.23 -25.96
1980 5/9 72.95 9/19 75 .42 -19.07 2.25 56.72 35.41
1981 4/16 72.67 9/18 69 .72 22.77 2.58 17 .71 37.90
1982 8/6 67.87 9/20 67 .85 0.15 1.66 15.98 14.48
1983 0.00 0.00 -47.65 -47.65
1984 5/11 64.60 9/20 64 .95 -2.70 2.26 1.05 -3.92
1985 4/19 68.45 9/20 62 .70 44.39 2.26 -43.12 -0.99
1974--85 Mean 2.06 8.87
Std 51.95 47.83
Mean-std -49.90 -38.95
1981 -85 Mean -11.21 -0.04
Std 28.54 28.05
Mean-std -39.74 -28.08
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Table 3.12. Strategy VIIL positive basis hedge
Year Sale Purchase Per Cost Net profit
• • • • ———animal of •
Date Price Date Price gain hedging Without With
from futures hedge hedge
1974 4/26 41 .80 9/20 30.00 91.09 1.89 -92.79 -3.59
1975 5/30 33 .45 9/19 38.75 -40.91 1.78 64.87 22.18
1976 9/10 36 .60 9/20 35.60 7.72 1.05 -48.06 -41.39
1977 6/10 39 .65 9/20 40 .50 -6 .56 1.53 9.96 1.87
1978 6/2 60 .10 9/20 67.90 -60.21 1.68 96.22 34.33
1979 5/4 86 .40 9/20 84.90 11.58 1.85 -6.23 3.50
1980 5/2 68 .20 9/19 75.42 -55.73 2.25 56.72 -1.26
1981 0.00 0.00 17.71 17.71
1982 5/21 65 .55 9/20 67,85 -17.75 2.23 15.98 -4.00
1983 5/20 65 .05 9/20 59.37 43.85 2.05 -47.65 -5.86
1984 0.00 0.00 1.05 1.05
1985 0.00 0.00 -43.12 -43.12
1974-85 Mean 2.06 -1.55
Std 51.95 21 .62
Mean-std -49.90 -23.17
1981-85 Mean -11.21 -6.84
Std 28.54 19.95
Mean-std -39.74 -26.79
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Table 3.13. Strategy IX moving average hedge
Year Con- Sold or bought Sold or bought Per
tract ' ' ' ' • — animal
Date Price Date Price gain hedging Without With
from hedge hedge
futures
Cost
of
Net profits
1974 Sept 4/26/74 41.80 9/20/74 30.00 91.09 1.89 -92 .79 -3 .59
1975 April 12/ 10/74 33.67 1/6 31.80 -14.44 1.23 64 .87 35 .17
April 3/21 30.65 4/18 32.45 13.89 1.23
Sept 7/28 32.25 9/5 35.55 -25.47 1.23
1976 April 9/16/75 36.50 4/20 47.75 86.84 2.15 -48.06 75 .24
Sept 6/29 40.80 9/20 35.60 40.14 1.53
1977 April 11/4/76 42.85 1/10 38.40 -34.35 1.37 9 .96 -12 .50
April 1/26 40.62 2/28 38.87 -13.51 1.20
April 3/4 40.35 4/20 45 .00 35.89 1.37
Sept 6/9 39.85 9/20 40.50 -5.02 1.53
1978 April 10/11/77 42.07 10/19/77 41.50 -4.40 1.05 96 .22 201 .86
April 10/21/77 42.35 4/20 57.00 113.09 2.00
1979 April 10/2/78 72.70 4/20 93.87 163.42 2.15 -6 .23 161 .46
Sept 5/23 84.45 8/31 83.42 7.95 1.53
1980 April 9/28/79 87.40 3/10 80.55 -52.88 2.47 56 .72 -51 .89
Sept 4/25 70.42 6/25 77. 12 -51.72 1.54
1981 Apri 1 10/1/80 80.22 1/26 73.87 -49.02 2.25 17 .71 -23 .08
Sept 4/28 71.20 8/27 69.55 12.74 2.25
1982 April 8/27/81 68.25 10/26/81 66.10 -16.60 1.66 15 .98 -13 .76
April 2/22 65.55 4/20 67.95 18.53 1.66
Sept 6/8 63.20 7/15 66 .70 -27.02 1.34
1983 April 1/5 67.72 4/7 70.17 18.91 1.81 -47 .65 9 .97
Sept 4/21 64.92 9/20 59.37 42.84 2.33
1984 April 11/2/83 64.60 4/5 68.32 28. 72 2.26 I .05 10.47
Sept 4/23 65.30 7/10 66.87 -12.12 1.77
Sept 8/3 66.25 8/6 66.72 -3.63 1.05
Sept 8/21 66 .20 9/5 65.90 2.32 1.28
Sept 9/12 65.15 9/20 64.95 1.54 1.05
1985 April 10/10 69.75 3/5 69.40 -2.70 2.26 -43 .12 -4 .02
Sept 4/22 68.70 9/20 62.70 46.32 2.26
1974-85 Mean 2 .06 32 .11
Std 51 .95 73 .68
Mean-std -49 .89 -41 .57
1981-85 Mean -11 .21 -4 .08
Std 28 .54 13 .14
Mean-std -39 .74 -17 .23
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Table 3.14. Strategy X econometric hedge
Year Qtr Con-
t ract
Sold or bought Per
an imal
gain
from
futures
Cos t
of
hedging
Net profit
Date Price Date Price Without
hedge
With
hedge
1981 2 April 1/20 76.55 4/20 71.15 -41.68 1.96 17.71 45.43
3 Sepl 4/20 72.20 7/20 62.70 73.33 1 .96
1982 2 Apr il 1/20 60.85 4/20 67.95 54.81 1.94 15.98 57.02
4 Sept 7/20 66.57 9/20 67.85 -9.88 1.94
1983 2 Apr il 1/20 67.65 4/20 70.07 18.68 1.81 -47.65 -5.96
3 Sept 4/20 65.00 7/20 61.55 26.63 1 .81
1984 4 Sept 7/20 67.30 9/20 64.95 18.14 1.77 1.05 17.42
1985 1 April 10/19 68.15 1/18 72.17 31.03 1.77 -43.12 •-25.76
2 ^ril 1/18 72.17 4/19 65.25 -53.42 0.72
3 Sept 4/19 68.45 7/19 62.75 44.00 1.77
Average -11.21 17.63
Std 28.54 30.87
Mean-std -39.74 --13.24
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transaction in the feeder cattle futures market. Per head dollar amounts
are listed for net gain from each futures transaction, the cost of each
hedge (conunissions and opportunity costs of margins), and profit with and
without using the stated hedging strategy.
Summary statistics included in each table are the per animal mean
and standard deviation of returns for both the 1974 to 1985 period and
the 1981 to 1985 period. The inclusion of separate 1981-85 results was
necessary so that all strategies could be compared to the econometric
hedge where data limitations reduced forecasts to the 1981-85 period.
The comparison of the strategies in the more recent years should also
provide insight into which strategies performed well in a difficult cash
marketing environment. The results from the one standard deviation
criterion are also listed in each table,
1974-1985 results
A Southern Iowa stocker operation (Table .3,4) relying strictly on
cash marketing would have realized an average return of $2,06/hd with a
standard deviation of $51.59/hd. If profits were normally distributed
then roughly half of the years experienced negative profits. The results
indicate that five of the twelve years had negative returns. A two
standard deviation rule suggests that roughly 95% of the returns would be
expected to be between -$100/hd and $100/hd. During this twelve year
period, the lowest profit was -$92,79/hd in 1974 and the highest was
$95.22 in 1978,
47
Routine hedging (Table 3.5) increased returns and lowered variance
over cash marketing. This implies that with no market monitoring and
with no knowledge of production costs a producer could still improve
returns by simply placing a short hedge when cattle were bought and
lifting it when cattle were sold. Routine hedging negated large positive
cash returns in 1976 and 78, but it also offset large losses in
1974,76,83 and 85.
A correctly placed stop order could let a producer benefit from
favorable price movements while still providing price protection from
unfavorable price moves. Table 3.6 shows the results from using a
$2.00/cwt stop loss order with Che routine hedge. The stop order was
effective in reducing losses in the futures market in four years while
only once lifting a hedge that was better left in place. As anticipated,
the stop order lifted hedges in years with strong upward price moves and
kept losses in the futures market from negating large cash returns.
All four hedging strategies based on profit level hedges had higher
means and lower variances than cash marketing. The short breakeven hedge
(Table 3.7) produced only two negative profit years. It has the same
effect as routine hedging in reducing both large negative and positive
cash positions. The breakeven hedge produced yearly results that were
often different than breakeven. This was the result of several factors.
In the late 1970s, above breakeven opportunities were available as soon
as the cattle were purchased and hedges were placed immediately. Profits
could also differ from breakeven because the basis was different than the
expected basis used to calculate the breakeven futures price. For
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example, in 1978 a more than breakeven hedge ($15.10/hd profit) was
available in the September contract as soon as the cattle were purchased.
This hedge resulted in a $-5.59/hd loss because the expected September
basis of $-L,35/cwt. turned out to be $-3«90/cwt. During the summer of
1978 local cash prices did not rise as much as futures did. Therefore,
cash gains were not able to offset losses from the short September
futures position. As with routine hedging, the short breakeven hedge
with a $2.00/cwC. stop loss order (Table 3.8) increased both returns and
variances.
The long-short breakeven hedge (Table 3.9) had both higher means and
variances than the short breakeven hedge. The two contract approach
enabled the producer to place hedges as soon as both the April and
September contracts for the same year were being simultaneously traded.
In the 1970s this enabled the producer to place much greater than break
even hedges the first day both contracts were in place.
The long-short $15/hd profit hedge (Table 3.10) increased returns
over the long-short breakeven hedge as expected, but had an unexpectedly
lower variance. Both long-short hedging strategies had only one negative
profit year (1985). In 1985, abnormal local basis in both spring and
fall caused large basis losses for the futures contracts. The April
basis (cash-futures) was much wider than usual and Che fall basis was
much narrower. (The April contract was lower than cash by more than
expected and the September contract was greater than cash by more than
expected.) Both of these basis changes hurt the long—short hedging
strategies' performances in 1985.
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The two basis hedges did aot perform as well as the other
strategies. The positive basis hedge (Table 3.12) was the only strategy
that resulted in lower average returns ($-l,55/hd) than cash marketing.
The negative basis hedge (Table 3.11) had a higher mean and lower
variance than cash, but to a lesser degree than the other strategies.
The negative basis' main virtue was its success in not placing a hedge in
strong cash marketing years, but it failed to insulate the producer from
the 1974 price decline. The positive basis strategy did place a hedge in
1974 but it did not provide price protection in the 1985 price decline
and it placed hedges that reduced potential returns in several strong
cash years. Basis did not turn out to be a reliable indicator of future
price movements.
The moving average hedge (Table 3.13) produced the most interesting
results. Although this strategy incurred the largest hedging costs
because of the large number of positions taken, it still produced the
highest average return of $32.11/hd. The moving average hedge also had
the highest standard deviation of all the strategies, including cash
marketing. As expected, the moving average hedge performed well in years
with strong price trends. Using the September contract it was able to
capture large gains from years with large price declines (1974, 1983,
1985) and using the April contract large gains were made in years with
major price increases (1976-79). Years with shifting or no trends
(1980-82) produced large losses in both contracts.
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1981-1985 returns
The average net profit per head with cash marketing during 1981-85
was $-11.21 with a $28.52/hd standard deviation. The variance was lower
than the 1974-85 period but this offers little consolation when mean
returns are negative. Cash marketing had the lowest return of any
marketing strategy studied over this time period.
The basis hedges were again the least desirable of the hedging
strategies. The average returns from these two strategies were both
superior to cash but they were both negative as well.
Of the 1974 to 1985 strategies the short breakeven hedge produced
the highest mean ($9,45/hd) and had the second lowest variance. The
other profit level hedges and routine hedges all produced positive single
digit average returns. The stop-loss orders were not as effective in
this time period because price trends were not as strong.
In general, prices declined over this period but there were a
sufficient number of price rallies to make it difficult to determine
short term trends. Under this climate it is not surprising that the
moving average strategy went from the highest mean in the earlier time
period to one of the lowest.
The econometric hedge performed well. It had the highest mean and
the second best mean-standard deviation result. The mean-standard
deviation criterion was important during this period because although
many hedging strategies had lower variances than the econometric hedge,
their returns were so low that variance was not as much a consideration
as negative profit. The econometric hedge had two negative profit years
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and only three of the ten hedges placed during this period lost any
money. The ability to always evaluate the placing of a hedge (long April
during the fourth and first quarters and short September during the
second and third quarters) provided opportunities during these lean, years
that the other strategies (except moving averages) did not have
available. The model did have some short comings. The large price
decline of 1985 was not predicted by the model and a long April position
taken during this time produced the largest losses of the ten contracts
placed. Despite this large loss that reduced the mean and increased the
variance, the econometric hedge still produced average returns that were
almost twice as large as the next best strategy and almost $30/hd more
than cash marketing.
Table 3.15 shows the mean and variance results of all the hedging
strategies for both time periods. The table illustrates the poor results
from cash marketing and basis hedges. The profit level hedges performed
well in both periods.
j^974-1985 rankings
Figure 3.2 contains a plot of means and variances of the hedging
strategies for the 1974-85 period. The cash marketing position is used
as an axis point that divides the graph into four quadrants. Quadrant A
represents the area that is unambiguously superior to cash marketing.
Quadrant C is unambiguously inferior to cash and Quadrants B and D are
ambiguous when compared to cash marketing.
52
Table 3.15. Mean and variance for all marketing strategies
1974--1985;
St andard
Strategy Mean deviat ion
IX Moving average 32.11 73.68
IV Short breakeven with stop 26.28 25.50
11 Routine with stop 25.91 25.86
VI Long-short $15/hd target 25.58 30.35
V Long-short breakeven 22.11 31.06
111 Short breakeven 17.96 15.74
1 Rout ine 14.77 18.23
VII Negative basis 8.87 47.83
Cash 2,06 51.95
VIII Positive basis -1.55 21.62
1981-•1985:
St andard
Strategy ttean deviat ion
X Econometric 17.63 30.87
111 Short breakeven 9.45 14.37
VI Long-short $15/hd target 5.03 27 .66
IV Short breakeven with stop 4.65 17.93
I Rout ine 4.48 17.96
11 Routine with stop 3.75 18.06
V Long-short breakeven 3.46 31 .62
Vll Negative basis -0.04 28.05
IX Moving average -4.08 13.14
VIll Positive basis -6.84 19.95
Cash -11.21 28.54
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All but two of the strategies were found Co be clearly superior Co
cash marketing. They produced both higher means and lower variances.
The strategy in the furthest upper left hand corner is the most preferred
strategy. Strategy IV is superior to strategies II, VII, VIII and VI but
cannot be compared directly to III which is superior to I. Individual
producers could choose among these strategies based on their risk
attitudes. &^me may prefer the lower variance of III over the higher
means of IV. Ignoring those strategies with stop orders (II and IV), the
best strategies were the short breakeven hedge (III) and the long-short
$15/hd profit hedge (VI).
None of Che strategies were found to be inferior to cash markeCing
in both means and variance. The positive basis hedge had a lower
variance but negative average returns. It could be argued that producers
would not prefer a lower variance alternative to cash if Che average
returns were negative.
The moving average hedge produced the most interesting result. It
had a significantly higher mean and variance than cash marketing. A
producer could suffer significant losses using this strategy during a
period of quick changes In price trends. Large gains could be made with
a repeat of the strong price trends of the late 1970s,
Figure 3.3 ranks the strategies according to the one standard
deviation rule. "Oiese rankings help compare strategies that are
difficult to choose between with mean variance analysis. The one
standard deviation criterion suggests chat the short breakeven hedge
(III) is superior to the long-short $15/hd profit hedge (VI).
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Approximately 84 percent of the returns from the short breakeven hedge
will be greater than $2.22/hd.
1981-1985 rankings
Using mean variance analysis (Figure 3.4) all but two hedging
strategies were found to be superior to cash marketing. The econometric
hedge and the long-short $15/hd profit hedge both had higher average
returns and higher variances. Of the strategies that were un^biguously
preferred over cash marketing, the short breakeven hedge was superior to
all others. In fact strategy III dominates all others except IX and X.
The moving average strategy (IX), however, has a negative mean return and
is not as viable an alternative as the econometric hedge (X) that has the
highest mean return.
Figure 3.5 ranks the strategies according to the one standard
deviation rule. Strategies III and X have the best rankings but III is
clearly superior using this criterion.
The mean variance criterion and the one standard deviation criterion
used to rank the various marketing alternatives do not take into account
one very important factor. The long-short hedging strategies have the
added advantage of enabling the stocker to choose not to produce at all
if the target profit is not achieved. With the other strategies,
protection is not achieved until after the stocker has either purchased
the cattle or has committed to purchase the cattle. The no production
option associated with the long-short hedging strategies is a distinct
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advantage not captured by either of Lhe other two comparison criteria
used in this study.
The best performing strategies over both time periods were the
profiL level hedges. Short profit level hedges had smaller variances but
long-short profit level hedges contained the no production option (i.e.,
no investment until target reached, then just basis risk thereafter).
Which of these two hedging strategies is the best depends on the ability
of the stocker to make use of the no production option of the long-short
profit level hedges.
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CHAPTER 4. CASH SETTLEMENT
Starting with the September 1986 contract, the method used to
fulfill a feeder cattle futures contract was changed from the delivery of
feeder cattle to cash settlement. This chapter examines some of the
problems with the old contract and their potential alleviation with the
new one.
Problems with Delivery
An advantage of hedging is that it allows the producer to lock in a
return long before the commodity is marketed. How accurate this expected
profit turns out to be depends on the accuracy of the producer's cost
estimate and basis estimate. If either estimate is incorrect then the
predetermined return will not be realized.
Table 4.1 shows how the expected return ($/hd) will differ from the
actual as the result of the basis deviating from its expected value. A
short breakeven hedge was used and costs were assumed to be known v^en
the hedge was placed. Therefore, any deviation in returns from expected
returns was the result of basis fluctuation. The expected basis used was
the average September basis for the twelve year period. By design, the
average deviation in returns was zero.
A narrower September basis (cash gains relative to futures) can
produce an increase in profits such as in the 1974 to 1977 period. A
wider basis causes a decrease in profits. In 1978 and 1985 Large basis
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Table 4,1. Change in profits caused by basis fluctuation
Year Expected profits Actual profits Di fference
1974 5.90 19.18 13.28
1975 5.22 24,29 19.07
1976 2.43 30.37 27,94
1977 34.97 40.53 6.57
1978 15.10 -5.59 -19.95
1979 62.56 34.15 -27 .45
1980 11.47 25.37 13.90
1981 41.76 37.90 -3.86
1982 2.08 4.94 2.86
1983 1.20 3.90 2.70
1984 7.13 1.49 -5.64
1985 24.78 -0.99 -25.77
deviations turned expected positive profits into actual negative
returns.
Some of the factors causing this large basis variability were the
result of having the delivery of feeder cattle as the method of
settlement for a futures contract. There were eleven different delivery
points that a hedger could choose for delivery. These delivery points
ranged from Montgomery, Alabama to Billings, Montana. The uncertainty
facing a buyer of feeder cattle on which delivery point a short might
choose forced many longs to offset their contracts rather than let them
expire and face the problems of accepting delivery.
Another problem with using delivery was the difficulty in putting
together uniform lots (weights, types and condition) as required by the
futures contract. The problems involved in making delivery caused many
shorts to offset their contract rather than deal with delivery.
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The combined effect of these two problems was to reduce both the
number of shorts willing to make delivery and the number of longs willing
to take delivery. In cases where the basis is deviating from its normal
amount there usually exists an opportunity to arbitrage the market. With
the costs and uncertainties involved in making and taking delivery with
feeder cattle futures, however, this was not being accomplished as
efficiently as in other markets.
Cash Settlement Performance
Cash settlement is a device used in place of physical deliveries of
a commodity to fulfill contract obligations upon contract maturity,
Allen Paul (Paul, 1985) describes the mechanics of cash settlement as
follows;
"Under cash settlement, the seller, who has not offset his or
her contract by the end of trading, in effect gives the buyer a
sum of money equal to the current economic value of the item
less a sum the buyer originally had to pay. Therefore, only
the difference need be paid by the seller to the buyer, or by
the buyer to the seller, according to whether the price rose or
fell during the contract interval."
Determining the "current economic value" of the commodity can prove to be
very difficult. Current cash prices provide an indicator of value, but
which cash prices should be used is not obvious. The cash market for
feeder cattle is composed of numerous thinly traded submarkets that
differ in location, quality and types of cattle, and local supply and
demand conditions. In order for an aggregation of these cash prices to
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provide an adequate United States cash feeder cattle price, it must
correlate fairly closely with changes in prices being faced by a
substantial number of hedgers using the futures market.
Under the new Chicago Mercantile Exchange cash settlement provision,
an average United States feeder cattle price calculated by Cattle-Fax
will be used. Cattle-Fax is a cattle industry marketing and consulting
firm which works extensively with feedlot and cow-calf operations to
obtain accurate cash market prices for feeder cattle. The cash
settlement of all expired contracts will be based on this price.
A recreation of basis over a five year period (1981-1985) using the
Cattle-Fax price series as futures prices for the current month revealed
that cash settlement has the potential to reduce basis variability.
Table 4.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of the basis for
1981 to 1985. Results for both cash settlement and delivery for the
Sioux City market are shown. The cash settlement basis is the difference
between the local cash price and the United States feeder steer price
(USFSP) calculated by Cattle-Fax. The delivery basis is the difference
between the local cash price and the nearby futures price.
The change to a cash settlement procedure changed the Sioux City
basis (cash-futures) from a negative 1.70 average to a positive 2.17
average. Hedgers using the feeder cattle futures will need to be aware
of the potential change in basis in their area and incorporate the new
basis into their hedging strategies.
The standard deviation was reduced from 1.78 to 1.42 with the use of
cash settlement. The cash settlement standard deviation was lower in
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eleven of the twelve months. The lower standard deviation associated
with cash settlement could potentially reduce the basis risk that was
being faced by hedgers using the feeder cattle futures market.
High variability may not be a hindrance iE it can be predicted. If
the delivery month basis followed a trend then the hedgers expected basis
could be more accurate than an expected basis from a more stable but
trendless basis. To test this hypothesis a basis expectation scheme was
used to compare delivery basis variability against cash settlement basis
variability. Three year moving averages of the April basis and the
September basis were used as expectations for the current year's basis in
each of those two months. Table 4.3 shows the differences between
expected and actual basis for both cash settlement and delivery.
The average absolute difference between expected basis and actual
basis was lower for cash settlement in all four cases. This indicates
that hedgers using a three year moving average for an expected basis will
face less basis risk with cash settlement than with delivery. There may,
however, exist other methods of forming basis expectations that result in
lower variability for delivery than for cash settlement.
The best method to analyze cash settlement would be to observe its
actual performance as a contract settlement device. Unfortunately, at
Che completion of this study only three months of data exist where cash
settlement was used for Che feeder caCCle futures contract. Table 4.4
shows the simulated average basis for September, October and November
from 1981 to 1985 with cash settlement and the actual basis that occurred
for chese months in 1986 with cash settlement.
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Table 4.3. Expected basis performance
Cash settlement:
April September
Year Expected Actual Absolute Expected Actual Absolute
bas is bas is difference bas is basis dif ference
1981 4.61 2.84 1.77 3.70 4.63 0.93
1982 4.42 3.26 1.16 3.60 4.39 0.79
1983 3.47 2.96 0.51 4.04 2.41 1 .63
1984 3.03 3.41 0.38 3.70 2.61 1.09
1985 3.20 2.07 1.13 3.08 3.18 0.10
Average 0.99 Average 0.91
Delivery:
April September
Year Expected Actual Absolute Expected Actual Absolute
basis basis difference bas is basis difference
1981 -1 .30 -0.57 0.73 -0 .40 -2.41 2.01
1982 -0.86 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.31 0.31
1983 -0.09 -3.38 3.29 -0.29 -0.17 0.12
1984 -1.27 -2.25 0.98 -0.76 0.83 1.59
1985 -1.83 -0.02 1.81 0.32 -1.82 2.14
Average 1.56 Average 1.23
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Table 4.4. Actual perforraaace of cash settlement basis
Month 1981-85 1986
September 2.38 2,11
October 2.15 3.60
November 2.10 1.72
Average 2.21 2.48
From observing this limited data base it appears that the local
basis Cor Sioux City has indeed changed from cash less than futures to
cash greater than futures. It will take several years of data to confirm
whether basis variability has been reduced.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLQSIONS
Summary
Stocker operations face considerable risk in backgrounding feeder
cattle. This study has focused on how stockers can improve profits and
reduce price risk through the use of the feeder cattle futures market.
Ihe feeder cattle futures contract provides stockers with an opportunity
to hedge both the purchase and sale price of feeder cattle.
A simulation was developed to test alternative marketing strategies
over a twelve year period. Results from the simulation indicated that
average returns from most hedging strategies were greater than returns
from cash marketing. In addition, most hedging strategies had lower
variances of returns as well.
Returns from cash marketing averaged $2.06/hd with a standard
deviation of $51.95/hd for 1974-85. The best hedging strategy during
this period was the short breakeven hedge with an average return of
$17.96/hd and a $15.74/hd standard deviation. From 1981-85, cash
marketing returns were $-11.21 with a standard deviation of $28.54/hd.
The best hedging strategy during this period was the short breakeven
hedge with returns of $9.45/hd and a standard deviation of $14.37/hd.
The econometric hedge was also a strong alternative to cash marketing
with average returns of $17.63/hd and a standard deviation of $30.87.
Overall, profit level hedges performed the best using the
combination criterion of mean variance and mean-standard deviation
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analysis. Long-short hedges had the particular advantage of potentially
locking in profits before the cattle were even purchased. Larger mean
returns were achieved with moving average and econometric hedges, but
both strategies provided more variable profits.
An analysis of the potential impact of cash settlement indicated
that basis variability may be reduced. A comparison between simulated
basis under cash settlement and the actual basis indicated that cash
settlement could reduce the volatility of basis by 25%. Actual results,
while too few to draw definite conclusions about cash settlement, were
consistent with simulated cash settlement results. It should be noted
that even if cash settlement reduces basis variability, this does not
imply an increase in profits. Reduced basis variability only ensures a
greater chance that hedging will produce the locked in price.
Conclusions
The results of the simulation provide encouraging news for stockers
attempting to increase returns and reduce the volatility of backgrounding
profits. The stocker program manager could have achieved these results
with simple profit level hedges. Although simple to implement, these
hedges require reliable estimates of the cost of production and basis for
both the purchase and sale dates. The stocker also needs to monitor the
futures market daily until the hedge is placed.
Other hedging strategies offered higher returns than profit level
hedges, but only at a cost. The moving average hedge and the econometric
hedge both had higher returns and higher variances. These strategies
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also have higher costs of developraenL and implementation. Larger stocker
operations may find these strategies more useful since they can spread
the costs over larger numbers of cattle.
Stocker operations may be reluctant to hedge because they do not
perceive cash marketing returns to be as poor as those found in the
simulation. Family run operations may not incorporate a labor cost or
even a return to land cost. This approach may be reasonable if there are
no opportunity costs for either their labor or land. Rural locations and
small sections of land could make this assumption plausible. Eliminating
these two costs yields a $12/hd profit instead of a $11.21/hd loss for
1981-85. This would also result in a corresponding increase in returns
for each hedging strategy. Results like these help explain why stocker
operations keep producing feeder cattle when returns appear negative to
economists.
Another reason why stocker operations do not use the futures market
is because a futures contract requires more cattle than the producer has
on pasture. Results from this study are only applicable to stocker
operations that are large enough to make use of the futures market
contract (44,000 lbs. per contract).
The marketing strategies examined in this study were analyzed over a
historical period. There is no guarantee that strategies that were
successful in recent history will perform as well in the future. Changes
in the livestock industry and futures markets could change the hedging
environment.
New tax law changes that reduce the tax advantages for feedlot
owners may reduce feeder cattle demand in the short run. Changing
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consumer LasLes away from red meat could also reduce Lhe demand for
feeder cattle. These structural changes in the cattle market could
change the distribution of profit opportunities for stocker operators
using strategies based on profit levels. For example, a $15/hd profit
hedge might not be attainable in a lower profit margin market.
Problems specific to the Iowa market may provide other limitations
on the use of hedging. During Lhe simulation period (1974-85), the
number of cattle on feed in Iowa dropped approximately 50 percent and the
Iowa calf crop fell almost 30 percent. With fewer calves being born in
the state and fewer being brought into the state, the Iowa cash markets
have been getting thinner. With fewer animals, there is a greater chance
that local cash prices may be out of line with larger cash markets.
There are several positive developments that could improve the
outlook for hedging strategies. If cash settlement is successful in
reducing basis risk, then hedgers can have more confidence that their
locked in price is the one actually received. In addition, the cost of
using the futures markets has been decreasing dramatically in Lhe past
several years. Brokerage costs used in Lhe simulation were $60 (round
trip) per contract. Presently, discount brokers are charging $25 for the
same service. Also, in 1987 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange will start
trading an options on feeder catLle futures contract which will provide
stocker operaLions with a new price risk management tool.
Southern Iowa stockers will need to supplement any hedging
strategies used with plenty of flexibility. Delaying Lhe sale of cattle
until local basis is closer to its normal level or transporting cattle to
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more liquid markets may be necessary. In order for hedging strategies to
be effective, local cash markets must maintain a consistent relationship
with the futures market. If local conditions are not providing that
consistency, then stocker operators need to adjust accordingly.
Overall, hedging strategies should always be evaluated by stocker
operations as a viable alternative to cash marketing. This study has
shovm that stockers who followed this advice for the last twelve years
were presented with numerous opportunities to increase returns and
decrease variance compared to cash marketing.
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APPENDIX A. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
A single equation econometric model was developed to forecast
feeder cattle prices on a quarterly basis. The forecasts from this model
were compared to "forecasted" prices from the feeder cattle futures
market. Hedging decisions were based on this comparison.
The Model
PFC = BO + B1 SFC +B2 DFC +B3 PFCCT-1) +B4 A +B5 JU +B6 0
where: PFC = feeder cattle price in the current quarter,
SFC ~ feeder cattle supply in the current quarter,
DFC = feeder cattle demand in the current quarter,
PFC(T-l) « feeder cattle price from last quarter, and
A, JU, 0 - dummies to deseasonalize the data.
Variables
The dependent variable was Che futures price for the near-by
contract in the third week of the month starting a new quarter. For
January, April and October this price was the closing price on Chat
month's futures contract. Since there is not a July futures contract,
the August futures price in the third week of July was used for the third
quarter. The demand for feeder cattle was measured as Che expected
profits from cattle placed in feedlots at the start of a quarter. The
expected profit was defined as:
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E(P) = (LCFP(T+2) - ECCOST))
where: E(P) « Expected profit for a feedlot from feeding cattle for the
next six months,
LCFP(T+2) = Live cattle future price for a month two quarters ahead.
Data from Chicago Mercantile Exchange in cents/lb
E(COST) = Expected cost to feed cattle in a feedlot for the next two
quarters. Data from USDA in cents/lb.
The live cattle futures price is the futures market participants'
expectation of live cattle prices in six months time. The expected cost
is a USDA estimate of the price required to cover all costs involved in
feeding cattle for the next six months. The difference between these two
expected prices is the expected profit from purchasing feeder cattle in
the current quarter and marketing them in two quarters time. A more
popular approach is to use proxy variables such as the corn/cattle price
ratio to represent expected profit and hence demand. Since the cost
element of the expected profit figure in this model includes other
relevant variables it is expected to be a superior indicator of demand
for feeder cattle.
Feeder cattle supply figures were taken from the USDA's quarterly
feeder cattle supply notices found in Livestock Situation and Outlook
Report. This supply figure includes all calves under 500 lbs. not yet
placed on feed, all steers over 500 lbs. not yet in feedlots and all
heifers over 500 lbs, not yet on feedlots or being kept for cow herd
replacement s.
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Using a supply figure of this nature has its advantages and
disadvantages. The current number of feeder calves available to enter
feedlots is the result of three calf marketing decisions.
1. Supplies are the result of herd expansion decisions made several
years ago based on cow-calf operators* expectations of profits from
retaining heifers for herd expansion versus selling them as feeder
cattle. The USDA's quarterly feeder cattle supply figure reflects the
effect of this decision.
2. The actual number of feeders available to enter feedlots is also
the result of current decisions on cow herd expansion. The feeder supply
figure used in this model includes all heifers over 500 lbs. not yet
placed on feedlots or being kept for cow herd replacements.
Unfortunately the supply figure does not distinguish between these two
categories of heifers. A large number of 500 lbs. heifers could be an
indication of large feeder supplies if they are destined for the feedlot,
or they could be an indication of low feeder supplies if they are being
kept for cow herd expansion. The supply figure used in this model does
not capture the effects of this decision very well.
3. The third calf marketing decision is the weight at which to sell
calves in the feeder market. An increase in price might induce more
lightweight feeder cattle into the market or it may induce cow-calf
operators to keep the animals longer. In either case it must be noted
that if more steers are put on or withheld from the market in one quarter
then once the decision process returns to "normal" the following quarters
will show an equal change in the opposite direction in regard to the
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marketing of steers. To illustrate this phenomenon suppose that cow-calf
operators market large numbers of lightweight steers in the third quarter
in response to some price change. If this is a one quarter decision then
the fourth quarter will show a drop in supply because those lightweight
steers would normally have been marketed in the fourth quarter.
The lagged feeder cattle price was included as an explanatory
variable. This lagged price should incorporate all price changes up to
the past quarter. Using lagged prices was found to be a superior method
of handling the effects of inflation.
Three quarterly dummies were used to deseasonalize the data. The
supply of feeder cattle has an annual trend with highs in the fall and
lows in the spring. In order to have the supply variable reflect only
change from its normal value and not the change from other quarter's
normal values, dummy variables are required.
Empirical results
The model was estimated using the data from 1974 to the second
quarter of 1980. The model was reestimated for each subsequent year
after the addition of four new quarters of data. The six models
(1980-1985) and their coefficients are reported in table A..1,
The sign on the supply coefficient is negative, indicating that an
increase in supply will cause a decrease in feeder cattle price. The
sign on the demand coefficient is positive, indicating that an increase
in expected profit will cause an increase in price.
80
Table A,1. Estimated parameter stability in the feeder cattle model
Sample period
74-79 74-80 74-81 74-82 74-83 74-84
Degrees of
freedom 18 22 26 30 34 38
Parameters:
Intercept 146,03
(4.50)^
142.26
(4.95)
141.96
(5.37)
140.01
(5.73)
140.47
(6.03)
138.25
(6.02)
Supply -.0027
(4.32)
-.0026
(4.76)
-.0026
(5.16)
-.0026
(5.51)
-.0026
C5.78)
-.0025
(5.75)
Demand .420
(0.76)
.738
(1.54)
.779
(1.84)
.705
(1.93)
.803
(2.68)
.817
(2.71)
Lagged price .438
C3.25)
.487
(4.39)
.488
(4.83)
.499
(5.36)
.501
(5.63)
.499
(5.60)
Dummy A -14.31
(4.78)
-14.64
(3.37)
-14.70
(3.72)
-14.31
(4.01)
-14.90
(3.35)
-15.31
(4.72)
Dummy JU 25 .14
(8.54)
24.71
(3.43)
24.29
(3.75)
23.94
(4.07)
23.46
(5.58)
23.03
(4.20)
Dummy 0 4.74
(3.86)
5.12
(1.54)
5.13
Cl.78)
4.99
(1.94)
4.51
(2.35)
4.04
(1.77)
Summary statistics:
.93 .94 .94 .94 .94 .94
MSE 33.05 30.09 25.66 22.76 20.79 21.21
statistics for individual paraneters are in parentheses.
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The 1974-85 model had a mean sqaare error of 21.21. The coefficient
of determination was approximately 94% for all six models. The C
statistics were significant for all the variables in the 1974-85 model,
except for the fourth quarter dummy variable in several of the sample
periods.
Forecasts
The model can be used as a one step ahead forecast if reasonable
representations of next quarter's supply and demand variables can be
found.
For the supply variable, the current quarter's change from its level
the previous year is used as an approximation for the change in next
quarter's supply from its level in the previous year. Next quarter's
supply is equal to its value the previous year adjusted by the change
factor calculated from the current quarter.
For the demand variable, the expected profit becomes;
ECP)T+1 =( LCF(T+3) - COSTCT) )
where: E(P)T+1 = expected profit for cattle put on feed in the next
quarter,
LCP(T+3) = live cattle futures price for a month three quarters
ahead, and
COST(T) = this quarter's cost figure is used as a naive forecast
for next quarters cost.
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Table A.2. Forecasted prices from the model versus actual prices
Year Quarter Forecasted Actual Difference Correct
80 3 69.87 73.87 -4.01 No
80 4 67.58 77.72 -10.14 No
81 1 77.49 73.37 4.12 Yes
8i 2 79.14 71.45 7.67 No
81 3 63.56 63.85 -0.29 Yes
81 4 65.06 66.00 -0.94 Yes
82 1 65.76 65.57 0. 19 Yes
82 2 64.10 67.95 -3.85 No
82 3 65.57 67.40 -1.83 Yes
82 4 62.76 66.97 -4.21 Yes
83 1 65.55 69.90 -4.35 No
83 2 72.23 70.07 2.16 Yes
83 3 62.48 62.17 0.31 Yes
83 4 61.66 62.42 -0, 76 No
84 1 64.61 69.10 -4.49 Yes
84 2 67.45 66.90 0.55 Yes
84 3 68.63 67.60 1.03 Yes
84 4 66.35 66.50 -0.15 Yes
85 1 71.15 72.82 -1.07 Yes
85 2 79.59 65.25 14.34 No
85 3 67.56 62.67 4.89 Yes
85 4 70.50 64.50 6.00 Yes
Mean absolute deviation = 3.52
Percent of quarters that model estimated correct direction of change
in price = 68%
Root mean square error » 4.97
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Results
Table A.2 shows the predicted prices for each quarter and the
corresponding actual price. The predictions for 1981 are one quarter
ahead forecasts based on the model using 1974-1980 data. The model was
then updated with the 1981 data and one quarter ahead forecasts were
found for 1982. This process was repeated for subsequent years.
The model correctly predicted 68% of the price direction changes
between quarters. This is an important measurement because both
speculators and hedgers can make use of reliable price direction
information as well as absolute price level forecasts.
The average forecasted price was $3.52 different than the actual
price. Eliminating the worst two price forecasts gives a $2.60
difference.
Futures comparison The forecasting ability of this model can be
compared to the futures market's "forecast" of next quarter's price. In
the third week of each new quarter, the futures price corresponding to
the nearby month starting the next quarter is used to represent the
market participants' best prediction of what next quarter's price will
be. For example, on January 20th 1985 the April futures was 67,52. This
figure is used as the futures market forecast for the second quarter of
1985. Table A.3 contains these forecasts and the results show that the
futures market correctly predicted 55% of the price direction changes
between quarters. The average absolute deviation between the futures
price and the actual price was $3.70. Eliminating the worst two
forecasts gave a $3.20 difference.
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Table A ,3. Forecasted prices from futures versus actual prices
Year Quarter Forecasted Actual Difference Correct
price price in prices direction
80 3 71.45 73.87 -2.42 No
80 4 74.47 77.72 -3.25 Yes
81 1 81.45 73.37 8.08 No
81 2 76.5 5 71.45 5.10 No
81 3 72.70 63.85 8.85 No
81 4 63. LQ 66.00 -2.90 No
82 1 67.90 65.57 2.33 No
82 2 60.85 67.95 -7. LO No
82 3 65.72 67.40 -1.68 Yes
82 4 66.07 66.97 -0.90 Yes
83 1 67.75 69.90 -2.15 Yes
83 2 67.65 70.07 2.42 No
83 3 65.60 62.17 3.43 Yes
83 4 60.87 62.42 -1.55 No
84 1 63.20 69.10 -5.90 Yes
84 2 68.82 66.90 1.92 Yes
84 3 66.12 67.60 -1.48 No
84 4 67.02 66.50 0.52 Yes
85 i 67.52 72.82 -5.30 Yes
85 2 72. L7 65.25 6.92 Yes
85 3 68.75 62.67 6.08 Yes
85 4 63.45 64.50 1.05 Yes
Mean absolute deviation = 3.70
Percent of quarters that forecasts had correct change in ciirection of
prices == 55%
Root mean square error = 4.44
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In both direction change and difference in price the econometric
model performed better than the futures market. Root mean square error
(RMSE) can also be used to compare the futures market to the econometric
model. This measurement is the average of the forecast errors squared
and Is designed to penalize individual large forecast errors. Since the
econometric model developed here contained the largest individual
forecast errors its RMSE is higher (4.97) than the futures market value
(4.44). Eliminating the worst two quarters from both forecasts gives a
RMSE of 3.43 for the model and 3.99 for the futures market.
Hedging The forecasts from this model can be used to make
hedging decisions. In the third week of each quarter, the model produces
a forecast of the futures price for the next quarter. This futures price
is for the nearby contract for the third week in each quarter. For
January, April and October, the nearby contract is that month's contract.
For July, the August futures is used. When the forecast is made, it is
compared to the futures market price for next quarter. If the forecast
price is higher than the futures then a long position is signaled. If
the forecasted price is lower than the futures then a short position is
signaled. This comparison is made only once each quarter. For example,
on the last day in the third week of October, when a new forecast is
produced, the forecasted price is compared to the January futures price.
If the forecasted price is higher than the futures price then futures
prices are predicted to rise.
In Lhe econometric hedge, a prediction that January's futures price
will rise is taken as a signal to place a long hedge. An assumption is
86
made LhaL the long position could be taken in the January, March or April
contract. In other words, if the forecast indicates that a particular
month's futures price will rise, it is assumed that all other nearby
contracts will rise as well. A long hedge signaled in January will be
implemented with the April contract. Short hedges signaled in April or
July will be implemented with the September contract.
Several refinements are needed to make this hedging strategy a more
realistic marketing tool. First, the evaluation of whether or not to
place a hedge should be a continuing process not a once a quarter
decision. A comparison between the latest forecast and the appropriate
futures price should be made daily until a hedge is placed. Second, in
order to eliminate the assumption that nearby futures months are highly
correlated, a two quarter ahead forecast for September and April would be
appropriate. The forecasts from a two quarter ahead model could be
compared directly with the futures month involving the sale or purchase
of cattle.
Initial attempts to correct the continual comparison problem
revealed that such a correction will enhance the hedging potential of the
econometric model. Comparing the forecast and the futures each day of
the quarter increased the chances Chat a hedging opportunity would
develop. Time constraints restricted any further study in this area.
